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Abstract
The paper argues that East Asian regionalism is fragile because (i) each
nation’s industrial competitiveness depends on the smooth functioning of
“Factory Asia”—in particular for intraregional trade; (ii) the unilateral tariff-
cutting  that  created  Factory  Asia  is  not  subject  to  WTO  discipline
(bindings); (iii) there is no “top-level management” to substitute for WTO
discipline,  to  ensure  that  bilateral  trade  tensions—tensions  that  are
inevitable in East Asia—do not spill over into region-wide problems due to
lack  of  cooperation  and  communication.  This  paper  argues  that  the
window of opportunity for East Asian vision was missed; what East Asia
needs now is management, not vision. East Asia should launch a “New
East  Asian  Regional  Management  Effort”  with  a  reinforced  ASEAN+3
leading the way. The first priority should be to bind the region’s unilateral
tariff cuts into the WTO.
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Singapore  (SCAPE  conference,  NUS)  feedback.  In  particular,  the  author  benefited  from  the
comments  and  suggestions  of  Inkyo  Cheong.  Raymond  Atje,  Will  Martin,  Mitsuyo  Ando,  Jota
Ishikawa, Thitapha Wattanapruttispaisan, Anna Robeniol, Jim Wallar, Claude Barfield, and Termsak
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1. INTRODUCTION
East Asia is one of the wonders of the world. Like a gigantic, impossibly complex
and wonderfully efficient factory, the region churns out millions of products with
world-beating price-quality ratios, sourcing the billions of parts and components
from  plants  spread  across  a  dozen  nations.  East  Asian  corporations  set  up
“Factory Asia” and they are running it now. Following the analogy, corporations
are  Factory  Asia’s  “mid-level  managers”  and  middle  management  is  doing  a
marvelous  job,  keeping  things  running  smoothing  and  profitably,  solving  any
number of big and small problems along the way. But where is Factory Asia’s
“top-level” management? Whose  job  would  it  be  to  ensure  that  bilateral  trade
tensions—tensions that are inevitable in East Asia—do not get out of hand or spill
over into region-wide problems?
This paper argues that the current state of East Asian regionalism is fragile due to
three facts.
 Each nation’s industrial competitiveness is heavily dependent on the smooth
functioning of Factory Asia—in particular on the free flow of intraregional trade.
 The  tariff-cutting  that  created  Factory  Asia  was  done  unilaterally  by  the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC); these tariff cuts were not “bound” in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and so are not subject to WTO discipline. What this so-called “bindings
overhang” means is that East Asian tariffs could go back up overnight without
violating any WTO rules (indeed, we saw some of this during the 1997 crisis).
Because the smooth functioning of Factory Asia is in everyone’s interest, this lack
of WTO discipline would not be a serious problem if there were some mechanism
for managing conflicts—making sure that small problems did not tumble out of
control due to a lack of communication and coordination.
 The third source of fragility is the lack of top-level management in the region
to  substitute  for  WTO  discipline.  European  regionalism  has  both  top-level
management (the European Union, or EU) and WTO discipline (Europeans have
bound  their  tariffs  at  very  low  levels).  The  same  is  true  of  North  American
regionalism.
The implications of these three facts are straightforward. While it has long been
recognized that East Asia is short of “international public goods,” progress on
setting up such goods has been hindered by a lack of vision.
2 Questions such as
“who should take the lead?” and “what should be the long-run goals?” have no
easy answer and so have been left unanswered. The time for East Asian vision,
however, is gone. What East Asia needs now is management, not vision. And the
need is pressing. Given its vast political, cultural and economic diversity, East
Asia has always been a region prone to conflict among small nations. (It is also
prone to conflicts among big nations but that is it true of all regions of the world).
Given  the  extreme  supply-side  integration  of  the  region,  such  small-country
conflicts could pose a threat to the competitiveness of Japan, Republic of Korea
2 See, for example, Fukuyama (2005), Severino, R. et al (2005), or the East Asian Vision Group’s
report, available at the ASEAN website.4
(Korea), PRC, and ASEAN firms in US and European markets. For example, a
serious commercial dispute between Malaysia and Thailand, say, or Indonesia
and Malaysia, could hinder the production of Japanese firms. If a simple bilateral
conflict spun out of control and began to spread—as happened in Europe during
the 1930s—Japanese firms might find it very difficult to provide low-cost, high-
quality  products  to  European  and  American  markets  in  a  timely  fashion.  The
same is true for Korean, PRC, and ASEAN firms.
It should also be noted that a new source of tensions is about to appear in the
region.  The  commercially  important  elements  of  East  Asian  regionalism,  the
PRC-ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA) and the Japan-ASEAN bilaterals are
just  starting  to  cut  tariffs  on  a  discriminatory  (preferential)  basis.  Such
discrimination has led to trade tensions in other regions. Although East Asia may
be lucky enough to avoid such problems, the extreme interdependence of East
Asians’  competitiveness  suggests  such  things  should  not  be  left  to  luck.  The
region should establish a “New East Asian Regional Management Effort,” with a
reinforced ASEAN+3 the most likely candidate for the job. The first priority should
be to bind the region’s unilateral tariff cuts in the WTO.
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. Section 2, presents the state-
of-play in East Asian regionalism, arguing that its trade arrangements are marked
by a “Noodle Bowl Syndrome” (an unorganized tangle of bilateral trade deals).
This section also explains how the Noodle Bowl was created by distinguishing
three  phases:  “rampant  unilateralism”  1980–1990,  “regionalism  delayed,
unilateralism accelerated” 1990–2000, and “real regionalism” 2000 to present. It
argues  that  the  development  of  Factory  Asia  drove  the  first  two  phases,  but
PRC’s FTA demarche toward ASEAN triggered a domino effect in the region that
led to the current tangle of FTAs.
Section  3  fleshes  out  the  argument  that  East  Asian  trade  is  fragile.  It  also
contends that East Asia is about to experience a series of shocks as real tariff
discrimination appears in the region for the first time. Section 4 presents some
ideas on how the region might manage this fragility in the short-run and remove it
in the long-run through the development of an East Asian free trade association
modeled  on  Europe’s  “other”  regional  arrangement,  the  European  Free  Trade
Association (EFTA). The final section presents concluding remarks.5
2. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
When  it  comes  to  East  Asian  regionalism,  the  state  of  play  is  easily
summarized—it  is  a  mess.  Dozens  if  not  hundreds  of  trade  deals  are  under
discussion, under negotiation, or already signed. Even limiting the universe to the
deals  that  have  been  signed  or  are  near  signing,  it  is  clear  that  East  Asian
regionalism has the Noodle Bowl Syndrome.
Figure 1: East Asia’s Noodle Bowl Syndrome
Note: The map shows FTAs signed or under negotiation as of January 2006. East Asia is defined
here as the 10 members of ASEAN, PRC, Japan, and Korea.
Source: Author’s compilation.
2.1. The East Asian Noodle Bowl
3
Figure 1 makes the point graphically. The figure shows each FTA that has been
or is near to being signed. Specifically, by the end of 2005, the region had signed
what  amounts  to  57  FTAs.  The  ASEAN-PRC  FTA  (ACFTA)  is  counted  as  10
separate  deals  due  to  ASEAN’s  rather  unique  method  of  preferential
liberalization. The reality is extremely complex, but roughly speaking, PRC and
each ASEAN country chooses its own “sensitive list” and bilateral market access
3 The  mess  was  first  dubbed  the  “Noodle  Bowl  Syndrome”  in  Baldwin  (2004),  but  it  should  be
































depends upon the interaction of the two lists. Nations do not get preferences for
items  on  their  own  list  and  are  not  granted  preferences  for  items  on  the
counterparty’s  list.  All  bilateral  links  inside  the  ASEAN  FTA  (AFTA)  are  listed
separately for the same reason. The fractured nature of ASEAN’s basic approach
to preferential trade implies that the degree of market access faced by an AFTA
exporter  of  any  particular  product  varies  according  to  the  ASEAN  destination-
market  concerned.  For  example,  we  cannot  view  the  Malaysia-Indonesia
preferential tariff structure as identical, or even close to the Singapore-Philippines
preferential  tariff  structure.  Thus  AFTA  acts  as  if  it  were  45  bilateral  trade
relationships  (10  times  9  divided  by  2).  Fortunately,  the  existence  of  ASEAN
implies  that  55  bilaterals  are  not  completely  dissimilar—ASEAN  has  imposed
some  discipline  on  rules  of  origin,  product  exclusion  practices  and  phase-in
modalities.  Finally,  Japan  has  signed  FTAs  with  Malaysia  and  Singapore  with
these being de jure as well as de facto separate agreements. See Whalley and
Banda (2005) for a detailed assessment of ASEAN’s trade deals.
By the end of 2006, however, it seemed likely that the region would have at least
13 more deals—10 de facto bilaterals from the impending ASEAN-Korea FTA,
and  3 more  bilaterals  between  Japan  and the advanced  ASEANs—Indonesia,
Philippines, and Thailand. That brings the total to 70. Japan may also conclude
FTAs with Viet Nam and Brunei Darussalam and ASEAN as a whole, bringing the
total to at least 75. Of course, a reasonable person could count these differently
and come up with a different number, only serving to strengthen the basic point:
in the Noodle Bowl, it is unclear just how many deals there are in the region.
How did East Asian trade relations get so tangled?
2.2. No real regionalism yet
Strange as it may seem, despite Figure 1 there is as yet no real regionalism in
East Asia. Regionalism means preferential trade liberalization, or discriminatory
trade liberalization, because preference is just another word for discrimination. By
that definition, there is not yet any real regionalism in East Asia. The two most
commercially important signed sets of arrangements—the ASEAN-PRC FTA and
the ASEAN-Japan bilaterals—are supposed to be phased in over the next 5 years,
but they have not yet undertaken any serious discriminatory tariff cutting. The only
scheme  that  has  been  substantially  implemented—AFTA—is  not  actually  used
(more on this below).
How was Factory Asia established without any real regionalism?
The answer to this question reveals many critical facts about the region and many
aspects of East Asia’s trade relations that are highly unusual by global standards.
In answering the question, it is useful to distinguish three phases of East Asia’s
regionalism.
 Phase  I:  Rampant  Unilateralism—From  the  mid-1980s  to  1990,  tariffs  on
intraregional trade came down, but this was due to unilateral tariff cutting driven
by competition for investments and jobs related to the development of what can
be called Factory Asia.
 Phase II: Regionalism Delayed, Unilateralism  Accelerated—From roughly
1990 to 2000, East Asia witnessed an acceleration of unilateral tariff cuts as
PRC’s emergence heightened the competition among East Asians for jobs and7
investment linked to an ever-expanding Factory Asia. Additionally, two formal
arrangements  began—the  ASEAN  FTA  (AFTA)  and  Asia-Pacific  Economic
Cooperation (APEC)—but neither created much discrimination nor had much
effect on trade flows, as we shall see.
 Phase  III:  Rampant  Regionalism—In  November  2000,  PRC  Premier  Zhu
Rongji  triggered  a  domino  effect  by  suggesting  that  the  PRC  might  be
interested  in  an  FTA  with  ASEAN.  This  idiosyncratic  initiative  presented  the
nations  excluded  with  a  new  situation,  which  in  turn  strengthened  pro-FTA
political  forces  in  them,  especially  in  Japan  and  Korea.  The  result  was  a
sequence  of  FTAs,  each  of  which  served  to  further  strengthen  the  pro-FTA
forces in all economies across the region. The ASEAN-Japan FTAs, the Korea-
ASEAN  FTA,  and  the  Japan-Korea  FTA  are  direct  reactions  to  the  PRC-
ASEAN FTA, according to the author’s reading of history.
Consider each phase in turn:
2.2.1. Phase I: Unilateralism and competition for Factory Asia jobs
East  Asian  trade  was  suppressed  before  1985  by  three  factors:  by  the  very
unequal distribution of economic size within the region (Japan was the only large
economy); by the great disparities in development levels (which implied that the
natural trade pattern would follow the North/South template of inter-industry trade
and  this  entails  low  trade  volumes);  and  by  widely  adopted,  “dual  track”
development strategies that blocked the import of manufactured goods for final
consumption  while  simultaneously  fostering  manufactured  exports  to  nations
outside the region (Ando and Kimura 2004).
Starting  in  the  mid-1980s,  three  interlinked  factors  launched  the  expansion  of
intra-Asian trade and what might be called rampant unilateralism. The factors are:
 Erosion  of  Japan’s  comparative  advantage  in  manufacturing—The
phenomenal growth of Japanese incomes and wages in the 1980s and 1990s
eroded  the  nation’s  comparative  advantage  in  manufacturing.  Specifically,
Japan’s  productivity  growth  in  labor-intensive  processes  was  outstripped  by
overall  Japanese  productivity  growth.  Wage  growth,  of  course,  is  linked  to
overall  productivity,  so  rising  wages  were  not  fully  compensated  by  labor
productivity  growth  in  labor-intensive  activity,  and  unit  labor  costs  in  labor-
intensive processes started to rise.
Japanese  businesses  reacted  by  seeking  lower  cost  manufacturing  sites  for
labor-intensive  stages  of  production;  the  obvious  solution  was  to  move  these
stages of manufacturing off-shore to nearby East Asian nations. This tendency,
which has been called the “hollowing out” of the Japanese economy, started the
development  of  Factory  Asia  or  the  “Asian  Manufacturing  Matrix.”
4 Instead  of
making Japanese goods in Japan and selling them in the US or Europe, a new
pattern of “triangle trade” emerged. Firms headquartered in Japan would produce
certain hi-tech parts in Japan, ship them to factories in ASEAN for labor-intensive
stages  of  production  (including  assembly)  and  ship  the  finished  products  to
western markets or back to Japan. This division of East Asia into headquarter
(HQ)  economies  and  factory  economies  strengthened  as  Hong  Kong,  China;
4 The best papers on Factory Asia are Ando (2004), Ando and Kimura (2004, 2005), Kimura and
Ando (2003, 2005), Ng and Yeats (2003), and Fukao, Ishito, and Ito (2003).8
Korea;  Singapore;  and  Taipei,China  were  similarly  hollowed  out  and  likewise
their most labor-intensive production stages off-shore to East Asian economies
where low wages more than compensated for low labor productivity.
 Reduced  cost  of  moving  goods  and  ideas—Advances  in  information
technology and the falling costs of transportation, especially air freight, facilitated
and accelerated the development of the Asian Manufacturing Matrix by making
complex production structures easier and cheaper to manage, while at the same
time making them more flexible and more reliable.
 The  PRC—PRC’s  opening  up  and  domestic  pro-market  reforms  brought
something  like  a  half  billion  low-wage/low-productivity  workers  to  the  gates  of
Factory Asia. This accelerated the erosion of the HQ economies’ comparative
advantage  in  labor-intensive  production  processes  while  simultaneously
expanding the attractiveness of moving industries off-shore. In short, the PRC
added  a  pull-factor  to  push-factors,  quickening  the  hollowing  out  of  the  HQ
economies (Hong Kong, China; Japan; Korea; Taipei,China; and Singapore).
Development of the Asian Manufacturing Matrix
Figure  2 shows  the  number  of  plants  from  Japan’s  electrical  machinery  and
automobile industries that set up in selected East Asian countries (plainly, the
number of plants is only a rough indicator of the actual degree of hollowing out).
This process started gradually, but picked up speed in the late 1980s. Between
1975 and 1990, the total rose three and a half times, almost half the increase
coming between 1985 and 1990. The figure also shows that the PRC was not a
major player in the competition for plant locations prior to 1990. The big locations
in  Phase  I  were  Thailand  and  Malaysia.  These  plants  generated  new  trade,
almost all of it in machinery and much of it in parts and components.
Figure 2: Japanese plants in Emerging East Asia, 1975–2004
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Note: The figure shows the sum of auto and electrical machinery plants.
Source: "The Coming Age of PRC-plus-One," Fujita and Hamaguchi (2006) presentation at IDE-
JETRO  workshop  January  2006  (original  based  on  data  from  “Kaigai  shinshutsu  kigyo  soran”
various years).9
The typical “triangle trade” involved a Japanese firm sending high-end parts to an
affiliated plant located in, say, Thailand. In some cases the goods would then be
shipped back to Japan for final sale or further processing, but often would be
shipped for final consumption to the US or European markets.
More  direct  evidence  of  the  development  of  the  Asian  Manufacturing  Matrix
comes  from  the  IDE-JETRO  international  input-output  table.  This  shows  the
country  of  origin  of  imported  manufactured  goods  purchased  by  the
manufacturing  sector  of  each  East  Asian  economy. Table 1  has  three  panels
corresponding to the Matrix in 1985, 1990, and 2000.
The top panel shows the situation in 1985 when the Matrix was very simple. With
the exception of Singapore, East Asian nations sourced imported manufactured
inputs from Japan and the rest of the world—all the rows are dominated by zeros
except those of Japan and the rest of the world (mainly the US and Europe). By
1990 (second panel), the Matrix was more complex: Triangle trade still dominated
the  picture,  with  the  low-wage  nations  (first  five  columns)  buying  inputs  from
Japan and the rest of the world, but providing no inputs in return. Now, however
Hong Kong, China; Korea; and Taipei,China have joined Japan as HQ economies
after  their  own  hollowing-out  phase,  and  new  triangle  trade  appeared.  This
involves  the  shipment  of  parts  from  the  new  HQ  economies  to  the  factory
economies  (the  PRC  and  the  advanced  ASEAN  economies  of  Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) and can be seen from the emergence of new
non-zero entries in the rows for  Korea; Singapore; Taipei,China.
By 2000, the matrix was truly complex. Firms based in the factory economies
began  to  source  parts from  other factory  economies  rather than from  the  HQ
economy  alone.  In  particular,  PRC,  Malaysia,  and  Thailand  became  important
suppliers of parts to other factory economies, including each other. In short, the
input-output  matrix  went  from  simple  triangle  trade  to  a  much  more  complex
situation where factory economies were both producers and buyers of parts and
components.
Table 1: Widening and deepening of the Asian Manufacturing Matrix—1985,
1990, and 2000
(Share of column economy’s manufactured input purchases from the row economy; numbers less than
2% and purchases from one’s own economy are zeroed out)









Japan 3% 12% 15% 4% 9% 9% 8% 9%
Rest of World 5% 15% 17% 9% 10% 39% 9% 7% 3%






Taipei,China 3% 4% 3% 3%
Korea 2% 2%10
Singapore 8% 2% 3%
Japan 8% 10% 9% 15% 21% 10% 8%
Rest of World 3% 21% 16% 14% 17% 36% 11% 8% 4%
2000 PRC Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Singapore Taipei,China Korea Japan
Indonesia 2%
Malaysia 4% 4% 10% 2%
Philippines
Thailand 4% 3% 3%
PRC 3% 2% 4% 4% 2%
Taipei,China 5% 6% 3% 3%
Korea 3% 4% 8% 3% 3% 4%
Singapore 14% 6% 4%
Japan 2% 6% 16% 22% 16% 17% 14% 7%
Rest of World 3% 11% 9% 7% 10% 23% 8% 5% 2%
Notes: The columns  would total 100% if each economy’s supply of inputs to its own manufactured sector were
included (often greater than 50%) and if numbers less than 2% had not been zeroed out.
Source:  IDE-JETRO,  Asian  input-output  matrix  (seven  sectors)  for  1985,  1990,  and  2000;  see,  for  example,
www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish /Books/Sds/082.html.
The rise of PRC’s position in the Matrix is especially noteworthy between 1990
and  2000.  At  the  beginning  of  the  decade,  it  neither  bought  nor  sold  much
manufactured  inputs  in East  Asia.  By  the  end  of  the  decade, there  are many
entries for the PRC column (which shows its purchase pattern) and the PRC row
(which  shows  which  nations  depend  a  lot  on  inputs  from  the  PRC).  The
flourishing of intra-ASEAN trade is also clear from the comparison of 1990 and
2000.
The message of Table 1 is clear: by 2000, the competitiveness of manufacturing
firms in East Asia depended heavily on the smooth functioning of regional trade.
A  disruption  of  trade  between  Malaysia  and  PRC,  say,  could  cause  serious
problems for Japanese and Korean firms trying to sell in the US.
Impact on East Asian tariffs: rampant unilateralism
The strategy of Japanese firms to move portions of their production off shore fit in
nicely with the export-track of the dual-track development strategies pursued by
the factory economies. To attract these investments, ASEAN unilaterally reduced
tariffs on triangle trade in what may be viewed as a “race to the bottom.” Often
this  came  in  the  form  of  “duty  drawbacks”  and  duty-free  treatment  for  plants
located  in  Export  Processing  Zones  (EPZs).
5 While  it  is  hard  to find  direct
evidence that the unilateral tariff cutting in this phase was caused by competition
for  Factory  Asia  investment,  anecdotal  evidence  is  abundant—for  example,
Kuchiki (2003, 2005).
Regardless of what caused it, unilateral tariff cutting is obvious from Figure 3. The
figure shows the average tariff calculated as total tariff revenue divided by total
imports.  This  is  the  broadest  definition  of  the  average  applied  tariff  since  it
encompasses all tariff schemes, including duty drawback arrangements.
5 Duty  drawbacks  involve  the  suspension  of  tariffs  on  parts  and  components  that  are  imported,
partially processed, and then re-exported. EPZs are geographically specific areas in which specified
goods are imported and exported duty-free because they do not leave the EPZ and thus do not
influence the local market.11
Figure 3: Unilateral Tariff Reductions in Selected East Asian Economies (%)
Note: Tariff revenue divided by total imports.
Source: Ando and Kimura (2005).
Both figures clearly show why the first two phases are called unilateralism. It is
useful to think of this sort of tariff cutting as quasi-regional because its effect was
to reduce tariffs only on intraregional trade, but was not formally discriminatory. It
was, in other words, de facto preferential tariff liberalization that involved no de
jure  preferences.  It  has  also  been  called  Asian-style  regionalism  (run  by
businessmen rather than lawyers and diplomats).
2.2.2. Phase II: Regionalism Delayed, Unilateralism Accelerated
The second phase began in 1991 with the call by then Malaysian prime minister
Mahathir bin Mohamad for an East Asian Economic Community (EAEC). While
this led to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in 1992, Mahathir’s vision
for the region was much broader. His vision, however, was not appreciated in
Washington, which feared that an Asia-only economic bloc might come to involve
or even be dominated by the PRC. The US was still quite uncertain in the early
1990s  about  the  PRC’s  motives,  and  its  economic  resurgence  caused  US
concern.  According  to  the  author’s  reading  of  history,  the  US  countered
Mahathir’s vision by pushing APEC forward in 1993. The US was adopting a well-
known  strategy  in  the  regionalism  game—undermining  a  preferential  trade
arrangement  by  proposing  a  larger  one.
6 The  diversionary  tactic  worked:  East
6 Best known was the strategy used by the United Kingdom (UK) to delay or prevent the formation
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Asian economies cared and still care far more about the US market, and the US
security role in the region was still seen as reassuring in the rapidly shifting post-
Cold War world. The “exclusively Asian” aspects of Mahathir’s vision struck many
in  the  region  as  too  risky.  In  1993,  the  oxymoron  “Open  Regionalism”  was
embraced  by  nations  throughout  the  region  and  APEC’s  Bogor  Goals  were
adopted. This is why Phase II is called “regionalism delayed.” The source of the
tag-line “unilateralism accelerated” should be clear from Figures 3 and 4.
APEC was designed explicitly to rule out preferential trade liberalization, which is
and always has been the defining element of regionalism. AFTA did little more to
foster  regionalism.  By  contrast,  the  unilateral  tariff-cutting  begun  in  the  1980s
accelerated into the new decade.
Extremely low utilization rates under AFTA
How can we be sure that the average tariff shown in Figure 3 does not reflect
AFTA’s  preferential  tariff  cuts?  We  have  two  bits  of  direct  evidence. First,
Figure 3 shows that the average applied MFN rate for the sectors responsible for
most trade in the region (machinery) came down more or less in tandem with the
average rate shown in Figure 3, so at least much of the tariff cutting came from
unilateral reductions in nondiscriminatory tariffs.
The second piece of evidence is that almost no trade took advantage of AFTA’s
preferential (discriminatory) tariff rates. This is not widely recognized because the
ASEAN  Secretariat  promotes  statistics that measure  progress  by  counting  the
number of tariff lines that have been partially or fully liberalized, not on the share
of intra-ASEAN trade that is conducted over the preferential tariff. As we shall
see, almost no one uses AFTA preferences.
Information from the late 1990s shows that AFTA preferences were not being
used  ( Figure 4).  Overall,  less  than  3%  of  intra-ASEAN  trade  benefited  from
AFTA’s preferences. Getting the preferential tariff rate requires the importer to
prove that the good actually originated in ASEAN (to avoid tariff fraud, whereby
goods from third  nations  are transshipped through  an  ASEAN  country  to  gain
preferential access). In AFTA this requires “Form D.” As it turns out, the vast
majority of traders found it more advantageous either to pay the MFN applied rate
(and thus avoid the administrative cost and delay of Form D) or to take advantage
of  other  schemes  such  as  duty  drawback  programs  or  duty-free  treatment  in
export processing zones.
Figures for 2002 are not much better: according to JETRO (2003) only 11.2% of
Thailand's  imports  from  AFTA  took  advantage  of  AFTA’s  Common  Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT). Malaysia's data suggest that just 4.1% of its exports to
AFTA enjoyed the CEPT preference. By comparison, utilization rates below 50%
are considered very low for European FTAs (Augier and Tong, 2005).
possibility of improved access to the UK market was very attractive to exporters on the continent.
Thus when the UK proposed a Europe-wide FTA as an alternative to deep economic and political
integration among the six proposed members, many Europeans were interested precisely because
the broader formation would also include preferential access to the UK market. The British-inspired
proposal did undercut some of the political and economic pressure for deep integration, but the six
eventually rejected it and went on to ratify the Treaty of Rome, ultimately setting up what became
the  EU.  The  UK  attended  the  initial  meeting  but  withdrew  at  an  early  stage  (see  Baldwin  and
Wyplosz, 2006, Chapter 1 for details).13
Figure 4: AFTA Utilization Rates (percent of Intra-ASEAN imports)
Source:  PriceCooperWaterhouse,  Presentation  to  the  10th  Meeting  of  the  ASEAN  Directors-
General of Customs, 24 July 2002
Why are AFTA preferences not used?
The reason for the low utilization rates is simple—AFTA’s margins of preference
on  the  high  trade-volume  goods  are  too  small  to  compensate  for  the
administrative cost and delay of applying for preferential tariff treatment. Evidence
for this can be seen in Figure 6 and Table 2. Figure 6 plots the intra-Asian trade
for each of the 99 HS chapters for the year 2003. Each bar represents the value
of trade in a single chapter. Of course, most of the labels are illegible, but that is
because  most  of  the  bars  are  equally  small.  Intra-ASEAN  is  completely
dominated by computer/machinery and electrical equipment (HS chapter 84 and
85, respectively), although there is also non-negligible trade in lubricants, fuels
and oil (HS 27).
Table 2 shows that the MFN tariffs on these high-volume goods are very low (less
than  2%)  so  AFTA’s  preferences  are  irrelevant.  Experience  from  the EU  and
NAFTA shows that even modest costs and/or delays from complying with rules of
origin will induce exporters to pay the MFN rate if the MFN rate is low. Given that
the  margins  of  preference  are  razor  thin—between  zero  and  1.5%—it  is  no
surprise that AFTA was almost never used.
A second salient point from Table 2 sheds some light on APEC’s irrelevance. Low
East Asian tariffs in the table are for the goods involved in Factory-Asia trade,
namely  general  machinery,  electrical  machinery  (including  electronics),  and
specialty  petroleum  derivatives.  This  unilateralism  was  not  extended  to  other
manufactured  goods  such  as  transport  machinery  (cars  and  trucks),  or  light
industry. This outcome is perfectly logical when thinking of unilateralism as driven
by  competition  for  Factory-Asia  jobs  and  investment,  but  it makes  little  sense
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Figure 6: Intra-ASEAN Trade by HS Chapter Product, 2003
Source: ASEAN Secretariat website.
Table 2: Intra-East Asian preference margins vis-à-vis EU and North America










Mining products (HS25-27) 1.7 2.6 1.7 0.9 0.3
General machinery (HS 84) 1.5 1.9 2.5 0.4 1.4
Electrical machinery (HS 85) 1.4 1.5 2.2 0.1 -0.3
Others 1.4 1.7 2.6 0.3 -0.6
Wood and paper 1.4 1.3 1.5 -0.1 0.5
Precision apparatus 1.2 1.3 2 0.1 0.7
Agriculture 41.0 29.7 30.9 -11.3 10.7
Light industry 26.8 8.3 12.8 -18.5 4.1
Food and beverages 21.8 26.4 25.8 4.6 9.8
Textiles and clothing 7.3 7.6 7.8 0.3 -3.1
Transportation machinery 4.6 2.8 8.6 -1.8 5.3
Pottery products 2.9 3.6 4.4 0.7 -1.3
Chemicals 2.4 3 2.7 0.6 -1.4
Basic metals 1.8 2.6 2.3 0.8 -0.7
All products 7.4 5.5 7.2 -1.9 1.5
Note: Tariff data for 2002; see Freudenberg and Paulmier (2005) for details of the calculations.
Source: Author’s reorganization of data drawn from Freudenberg and Paulmier (2005), Table 3.
Tariff liberalization in most economies is determined by the balance of political
forces within each nation or economy. To understand why a government finds it
politically optimal to remove a tariff that it previously found optimal to impose, one
has  to  focus  on  domestic  political  factors.  Group  photos  of  APEC  leaders  in
colorful shirts are not a driving force. To have an effect on tariffs a trade initiative




































example, rising competition for Asian Manufacturing Matrix investment created
new,  pro-liberalization  forces  within  the  East  Asian  factory  economies.  By
contrast,  nothing  in  the  APEC  process  had  an  independent  impact  on  the
domestic  political  forces  inside  APEC  member  economies.  Of  course,  APEC
leaders were happy to assign credit to the Bogor-process for liberalization that
was done for totally unrelated reasons. From a public relations perspective, it is
better to present liberalization as part of a broad, inclusive process rather than
the  result  of  a  race-to-the-bottom  competition  among  East  Asian  developing
economies.
2.2.3. Setting the stage for Phase III
Two events at the end of Phase II set the stage for the real regionalism that
started in Phase III.
Asian Financial crises
The spectacular growth of East Asian economies in the mid-1990s came to a
screeching halt with the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The big exception was the
PRC, which escaped almost unscathed (Figure 5), firming up its role as primus
inter pares in the gallery of East Asian developing nations. The Asian crisis had
an  important  influence  on  East  Asian  regionalism,  although  it  was  not,  in  the
author’s reading of history, a pivotal event. In particular
 It deeply shook East Asians’ faith in development strategies and the heavy
emphasis on US and European markets.
 It created a sense of commonality among East Asian nations and networking
among policy elites.
 Many East Asian firms that had been protected from global competition by
high tariffs suddenly found themselves faced with the full fury of globalization; the
resulting “industrial restructuring” was far from systematic and it certainly was not
optimal, but it did act as a brutal form of natural selection. The average East
Asian  firm  that  survived  the  1997  crisis  was  systematically  more  capable  of
standing up to international competition than the average East Asian firm before
the crisis. This was important since it exogenously reduced the anti-liberalization
pressure  from  import-competing  firms.  On  the  margin,  this  shift  in  political
economy forces within each nation made it politically optimal to remove some
tariffs that East Asian governments previously found it politically optimal to retain.
 It revealed the unsuitability of APEC as a vehicle for regional cooperation.
 PRC’s economic stability during the storm gave the country a big boost in its
competition  for  new  jobs  and  factories  from  the  ever-growing  Asian
Manufacturing Matrix (see Figure 5).
PRC’s looming WTO membership
Although the Asian crisis is usually viewed as the key turning point, PRC’s WTO
membership was far more important to re-arranging the alignment of pro-trade
and anti-trade forces in the region. As the 1990s drew to a close, PRC’s long-
running  attempt  to  join  the  WTO  began  to  look  like  it  would  succeed.  PRC
membership, many believed, would provide an external lock-in of the reforms the
nation  had  unilaterally  adopted.  This,  in  turn,  greatly  heightened  the
attractiveness of PRC as a location for FDI from the HQ economies (Hong Kong,16
China; Japan; Taipei,China; Korea; and Singapore). This became an increasingly
serious worry for the other factory economies in the region, especially Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines Thailand, and Viet Nam. And this set the stage for the next
phase of Asian regionalism.
2.2.4. Phase III of Asian Regionalism: PRC triggers a domino effect
At the November 2000 PRC-ASEAN Summit, PRC premier Zhu Rongji broached
the idea of an FTA between PRC and ASEAN. This initiative came as something
of a surprise to ASEAN members, but it was in line with PRC’s behavior in the
1990s. One key element of PRC’s economic development strategy of the 1980s
and 1990s was the desire to avoid antagonizing non-PRC states. Since PRC’s
success in attracting industrial jobs and investment was increasingly viewed as a
threat by some in ASEAN, Zhu Rongji decided to make a big-hearted gesture that
he hoped would assuage the ASEAN concern over PRC competition for Factory-
Asia jobs and investments.
The PRC offer was generally welcomed by ASEAN and led, 3 years later, to the
ASEAN-PRC Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), which promises to eliminate tariffs
on almost all bilateral trade between PRC and the 10 ASEAN members by 2010
(2015 for  Cambodia,  Myanmar,  Lao  PDR,  and  Viet  Nam, or  CMLV). The  first
domino triggered by the PRC move was among ASEAN itself. During the ACFTA
talks, ASEAN agreed to adopt the same deadlines and zero-tariff goals for intra-
AFTA trade.
7
Figure 5: Manufacturing Growth Index, 1990–2002 (1990 = 100)
Source: Daisuke Hiratsuka (2006); UNIDO Statistics Database, 3-digit ISIC Code (Rev.2); total manufacturing output.
7 Before the 2003 Bali II accord, AFTA preferences had to be between 5% and 0%; afterward, intra-































































Singapore China, People's Rep. of Japan
Korea, Rep.of Hong Kong, China17
PRC’s proposal to ASEAN set off alarm bells all around the region, but especially
in  the  main  HQ  economies  of  Japan  and  Korea.  Preferential  liberalization
between  two  of  Japan’s  major  markets—PRC  and  ASEAN—would  create
discrimination  against  goods  shipped  from  Japan.  ACFTA  markets  absorbed
more than a third of Japanese exports in 2003, with the figure set to rise much
higher  if  PRC’s  boom  continues  as  expected.  Importantly,  the  level  of
discrimination might be substantial since PRC and ASEAN have relatively high
MFN tariffs on many industrial goods, especially the sort of finished products at
which  Japan  excels—consumer  electronics,  autos  and  the  like.  If  Europe’s
experience  is  a  guide,  Japanese  firms  might  react  to  such  discrimination  by
moving  more  production  facilities  to  locations  inside  ACFTA.  Korea  faced  the
same problem.
In the early years of the new century, no one knew what ACFTA might become,
but Japan and Korea simply had to have a plan in case major tariff discrimination
did arise. In short, PRC’s demarche in November 2000 triggered a domino effect
that has produced the noodle bowl that is East Asian regionalism today.
Japan’s and Korea’s reaction
According to the domino theory and the historical precedents in Europe and North
America, “Plan A” for Japan should have been to redress the discrimination by
joining  ACFTA.  This  path,  however,  was  blocked.  ACFTA  was  not  an
organization that outsiders could join.
8 With Plan A out of the running, a Plan B
was  needed.  This  was  always  going  to  be  convoluted  since  its  goal  was  to
redress possible discrimination from a trade bloc without formally joining the trade
bloc. Experience in other parts of the world in regionalism suggested two Plan-B
responses: (i) form a separate trade bloc with other excluded nations (Japan-
Korea FTA), and (ii) seek bilaterals with the smaller/more-susceptible members of
the new trade bloc (Japan-ASEAN bilaterals). The Japanese government opted
to  follow  both.  The  Korean  government  faced  a  similar  situation  and  adopted
similar solutions.
If the Japan-Korea FTA gets signed, it is likely to trigger another domino effect
since PRC will face the possibility of discrimination in two of the three largest
economies in the region. A Korea-US FTA would also trigger a domino effect, but
unless the US proves willing to radically alter its FTA “template”—the basic FTA
deal offered to the many other nations that have signed or are negotiating FTAs
with the US—the Korea-US FTA is likely to be politically unpalatable to Korea.
9
Moreover, the US side is likely to have political difficulties with a Korea-US deal,
even if it follows the template, because the Korean manufacturing sector is far
more competitive than that of other US FTA partners. Of course, high-minded
geostrategic reasons may offset the opposition of US and Korean special interest
groups,  so  anything  can  happen,  but  such  reasons  do  not  yet  appear  to  be
pressing.
8 See Baldwin (2006) for details on the East Asian version of the Domino Theory.
9 The  administration  of  George  W  Bush  has  had  a  hard  time  putting  together  a  congressional
majority for FTAs and so prefers to use “templates” (combinations of concessions and exemptions
by  the  US  and  concessions  and  exemptions  by  the  counterparty)  that  have  won  congressional
approval in the past.18
2.3. Summary
In early 2006, East Asian regionalism looked likely to be built on four pillars: the
PRC-ASEAN  FTA,  the  Japan-ASEAN  bilaterals,  the  Korea-ASEAN  FTA,  and
AFTA. The Japan-Korea FTA looked unlikely as of December 2006, but if it does
get done, it will form a fifth pillar and certainly trigger another round of domino
effects. In short, trade relations in East Asia are a mess, or more precisely, it
looks  like  they  may  soon  become  a  mess  as  virtually  no  discriminatory
liberalization has yet occurred in the region. AFTA is not used and the other FTAs
have only just started cutting tariffs. If commitments are followed, however, things
will soon change. All the signed FTAs promise to eliminate bilateral tariffs in 5
years (by the end of 2010; 2015 for ASEAN’s CMLV members). If that happens,
discrimination will emerge in a big way.
3. FRAGILITY AND EMERGING TENSIONS
East Asian regionalism is based on a fragile system that will soon be subject to
new tensions. This section fleshes out the facts and logic behind these points.
3.1. Sources of fragility
The fragility of the East Asian system stems from the extreme interdependence of
economies’ competitiveness, the lack of WTO discipline, and the lack of top-level
management to deal with noodle bowl complexity.
3.1.1. The Noodle Bowl Syndrome
This  level  of  complexity  shown  in Figure 1  implies  that  trade  relations  in  the
region  are  heavily  interlinked.  Since  the  degree  of  protection  among  any  two
economies can alter political pressures for protection in others —that is the basic
mechanism of the domino theory—the overlapping and intersecting nature of the
Noodle Bowl is a source of fragility. The outcome of a trade dispute between, for
example,  Japan  and  Malaysia  in  the  auto  industry  has  the  potential  to  cause
problems  for  Malaysian-Indonesia  trade  relations.  Yet  the  Japan-Malaysia
problems  would  be  handled  by  a  dispute-settlement  body  that  is  completely
unrelated  to  the  one  that  would  handle  Malaysia-Indonesia  problems.  While
various  agreements  and  institutional  arrangements  may  spontaneously
coordinate when common problems arise, the complexity of the system makes
this outcome far from certain. Who, for instance, would be in charge of convening
a meeting of East Asian leaders in the event of a local trade dispute threatening
to spin out of control?19
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Figure 6: An Example of Interdependence in Factory Asia
Note: This shows the nations where parts are sourced for a hard-disk drive assembled in Thailand;
the disk drives are then shipped on to various markets to be used in various electronics.
Source: Adapted from Hiratsuka (2005). Figure 2
3.1.2. Interdependence in Factory Asia
Factory  Asia  started  simple,  but  now  all  manufacturing  sectors  East  Asia  are
tightly interlinked via regional trade. The facts and figures can be found in the
bottom panel of Table 1 for 2000. Figure 7 makes the point by example. The
diagram shows the sources of the various parts of a disk-drive that is assembled
in Thailand by the affiliate of a Japanese company. The disk itself is sourced from
the US, Japan, and Malaysia, the filter cap comes from Hong Kong, China, and
so on.  Of  course, the  disk  itself  consists  of  several  parts, some  of  which  are
imported from the US, Japan, and/or Malaysia, and the same can be said of most
of the parts listed. If the ultimate source of every bit of a disk drive were traced
out, the map would be impossibly complex. And one should note, that the disk-
drive  itself  is  an  intermediate  good  that  will  be  shipped  somewhere  and
assembled—together with an equally complex web of sourced parts—into some
electronic device.
The key point here is simple:20
 The competitiveness of firms from each East Asian economy now depends
upon  good  trade  relations  between  all  East  Asian  economies.  The  Japanese
firm’s  disk-drive  business  can  be  hurt  by  trade  trouble  between  PRC  and
Malaysia, between Thailand and Indonesia, or indeed between almost any pair of
economies in the region. The Japanese government may be able to look after
Japan’s trade links with other East Asians, but it would be virtually powerless to
mediate a dispute among other East Asian economies.
It is not useful to highlight scary, low-probability events, but it is crucial to point
out  that  regional  trade  flows  are  key  to  each  East  Asian  economy’s
competitiveness  in  the  world  economy.  If  something  happened  to  disrupt
intraregional trade, then all players would suffer.
3.1.3. Lack of WTO discipline: the bound versus applied tariff overhang
The  interdependence  of  the  region’s  manufacturing  sectors  is  quite  common
worldwide, even if the phenomenon is taken to extremes in East Asia. How do
North  America  and  Europe  deal  with  the  system-fragility  created  by  trade  in
intermediate inputs? There are two answers:
(i) When  it  comes  to  the  trade  where  interdependence  is  most  marked—
intraregional  trade—North  America  and  Europe  have  well-functioning  top-
level management. The US makes sure NAFTA trade runs smoothly and the
EU does the same for trade in the European and Mediterranean region.
(ii) There is also a trans-Atlantic exchange of investment and intermediate goods
in the manufacturing sector, but just as the PRC and Japan find it impossible
to agree who should fill the post of chief executive officer when it comes to
East Asian trade, the US and EU cannot decide who should be in charge of
trans-Atlantic  trade.  Instead,  they  let  WTO  discipline  provide  the  top-level
management.
In performing this role, the most important of the WTO’s rules is Article 2—tariff
bindings. Article 2 commits members to “bind” MFN tariffs, or in plain language, to
commit to never raise a tariff that is bound in the WTO. As the result of 50 years
of GATT Rounds, European and North American MFN tariffs are bound at very
low rates since they came down in tandem with intraregional preferential tariff-
cutting. Article 2 discipline is one reason that North Atlantic regionalism had a
happy  ending.  The  discrimination  caused  by  regionalism  on  either side  of the
Atlantic was tamed by multilateral tariff cutting and Article 2 discipline.
There are two key aspects to this historical precedent:
(i) Progressive MFN liberalization made sure that margins of preference never
got too big. Since discriminatory market access is a major source of inter-bloc
trade  tension,  the  GATT  Rounds  tended  to  prevent  deeper  and  wider
preferences from fuelling inter-bloc trade tensions.
(ii) WTO bindings of EU tariffs on US exports and US tariffs on EU exports meant
that a broad trans-Atlantic tariff-war would be illegal under GATT.
Of  course,  the  WTO  permits  all  manner  of  exceptions—antidumping  duties,
countervailing  duties,  safeguards  and  the  like—but  these  are  both  limited  to
specific products and require specific and well-disciplined procedures. Moreover,
the US and EU could, as sovereign states, decide to ignore WTO rules, but doing
so would not be taken lightly.21
To use an analogy, think of trade disputes as forest fires that can sometimes get
out of hand. The WTO’s rules do not make the world trade system fireproof, but
tariff bindings act as an enormous firebreak. Authorities must think long and hard
before  they  violate  Article  2.  More  to  the  point,  a  government  can  face  down
domestic calls for retaliation by claiming that such moves would violate GATT and
would  therefore  have  negative  repercussions  far  beyond  the  specific  trade
dispute.
Why can’t this work for East Asia?
East Asia’s Tariff Bindings Overhang
The East Asian Manufacturing Matrix depends upon four HQ economies, Japan;
Korea; Taipei,China; and Singapore, and six factory economies, PRC, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Table 3 shows the extent to which
GATT Article 2 disciplines the trade of these economies.













Japan 99.6 2.3 2.5 57.6 n.a.
Korea 94.5 10.1 6.7 21.9 3.2
PRC 100.0 9.1 9.5 24.3 2.7
Malaysia 83.7 14.9 9.1 80.8 3.1
Thailand 74.7 24.2 13.3 n.a. 3.4
Indonesia 96.6 35.6 6.7 51.2 1.2
Philippines 66.8 23.4 5.8 45.6 5.4
Viet Nam
Taipei,China 100.0 4.8 5.5 53.5 n.a.
Singapore 69.2 6.3 0.0 100.0 0.3
Note: n.a. = Not available
1  Simple  average  of  ad-valorem  duties,  non-agricultural  goods.  Vietnam  is  in  the  process  of  joining
WTO.
Source: WTO country profiles, 2005.
Japan, like the US and the EU, has bound almost all its tariffs at quite low rates;
the  simple  average  bound  tariff  is  just  2.3%.  Japan’s  average  applied  rate  is
almost identical.
10 Since Japan’s tariff bindings (Final bound) match the tariffs that
Japan actually charges (Applied), it would be impossible for Japan to raise its
tariffs much without violating GATT’s Article 2. This fact alone makes it almost
unthinkable for domestic political forces in Japan to ask the government for such
a thing. In other words, Japan’s post-war tariff cutting is WTO disciplined.
The  situation  for  Korea  is  broadly  similar.  Almost  all  its  tariffs  are  bound  at
moderate  rates—the  average  is  10%—but  the  MFN  tariffs  that  Korea  actually
charges is below the level at which they are bound. This means that Korea could
raise its MFN tariffs by 3 percentage points on average without violating Article 2.
In the world of trade diplomacy, this is called a “binding overhang” because much
of Korea’s unilateral tariff cutting over the past two decades is not covered by
commitments  not  to  raise  them.  Note  that  once  one  takes  account  of  all  the
10 The  applied  average  is  a  bit  higher  to  “continent  protection”  duties  such  as  antidumping  and
countervailing duties.22
special  tariff  treatment  that  Korea  unilaterally  extends  to  its  imports,  the real
average  Korean  tariff  is  just  3.2%  (Import  duties  as  a  share  of  total  imports).
GATT’s  Article  2  discipline  provides  an  important  firebreak  should  the  Korean
government  ever  find  itself  in  a  tariff-raising  firestorm  of  domestic  political
pressure, but not as much as it provides to the Japanese government.
The  PRC’s  binding  overhang  is  worse  than  Korea’s  by  some  measures.  For
example,  counting  all  the  unilateral  tariff  breaks  the  PRC  extends,  its  tariff
revenue is only 2.7% of the value of imports, but its unweighted average binding
is 10%. Of course, the WTO allows the PRC to withdraw on its own the unilateral
tariff  concessions  it  made  in  its  duty-drawback  and  Export  Processing  Zone
deals, so the gap between the actual and bound rates means that the WTO does
not provide much of a firebreak when it comes to the PRC government resisting
domestic calls for tariff hikes in the event of an intra-East Asian trade dispute.
The  binding-overhang  problem  is  much,  much  worse  for  the  four  big  ASEAN
economies  (Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines  and  Thailand).  A  much  narrower
range  of  tariffs  are  bound,  and  these  are  bound  at  very  high  rates,  15–35%.
These nations unilaterally grant duty-free MFN treatment to over half their imports
(this is part of “rampant unilateralism” above), and the real average tax on imports
is extremely low, about 3% for the biggest traders, Malaysia and Thailand, about
1% for Indonesia and only 5% for the Philippines. What this means is that the four
governments  could  not  tell  would-be  trade-war-makers  in  their  domestic  polity
that they cannot raise their tariffs without violating their WTO commitments. If a
tariff-raising forest fire breaks out in the domestic political environments of these
nations, WTO discipline will do very little to stop its spread.
Viet Nam is not yet a WTO member, so the Article 2 firebreak would do nothing to
help  the  government  resist  domestic  political  pressure  for  higher  tariffs  in  the
event  of  a  raging  trade  dispute.  Taipei,China’s  situation  is  similar  to  Korea’s.
Singapore  is  a  paragon  of  WTO  discipline;  the  city-state  bound  almost  all  its
tariffs at zero.
3.1.4. Lack of Top-level Management in Factory Asia
No organization or government is making sure things run smoothly in East Asia,
although there are several bodies that deal with various bilateral problems.
11 In a
region as interdependent as East Asia, however, bilateral bodies may very well
prove  insufficient  for  dealing  with  complex  trade  disputes  that  involve  several
nations in the region—especially disputes that lead to “reverse domino” effects,
that is, tariff hikes in one nation that are reactions to tariff hikes in other nations.
3.1.5. Summary of East Asia’s System-Fragility
If we think of East Asia as a magnificent factory, then duty-free trade flows are
the conveyor belts that bring the parts from one stage of processing to the next.
But this is not a linear factory of the type common in the 20
th century. Factory
Asia  is  a  21
st  century,  just-in-time  factory  where  the  inputs  are  arriving
11 For example, the PRC-ASEAN FTA says it will set up a dispute settlement arrangement, but it
does not appear to be in place yet. The Japan-Malaysia FTA sets up a bilateral dispute settlement
arrangement and it is likely that the other Japan bilaterals will have similar mechanism. AFTA has
something of a dispute settlement procedure, but given the extremely disjointed nature of ASEAN, it
is not very effective and has not been chosen as the focal dispute settlement body for ASEAN’s
FTAs with PRC, Japan, and Korea.23
continuously from all directions. If even a few “conveyor belts” break down, it will
disrupt production in many parts of the factory. This intense interdependence has
fostered and been fostered by unilateral tariff cutting, but this trade liberalization
is not disciplined by WTO rules. Nor is there any top-level management to ensure
that  localized  trade  disputes  do  not  spread  and  thus  threaten the  smooth
functioning of the system as a whole.
If  some  unpredictable  event  starts  a  fight  among  even  a  small  subset  of  the
“middle-level managers,” everyone could be harmed, so one hopes the middle-
level  managers  could  be  persuaded  to  settle  their  differences.  But  whose  job
would it be to sit everyone down in one room to talk things out?
Fragile may be too strong a word for this system; indeed it might withstand all
manner of pressures, but that would be by happenstance, not design. No one
designed Factory Asia and no one is in charge of making sure it runs smoothly.
3.2. Emerging Pressures
Why should one be concerned about the system? After all, things have gone well
for a couple of decades, so why worry? This is wishful thinking based on a false
premise.
East Asia has no experience with discriminatory trade liberalization. The many
FTAs that are in place have not yet created discrimination. As argued above,
none of the FTAs in the region that are likely to be effectively implemented—the
Japan-ASEAN bilaterals, the PRC-ASEAN FTA and perhaps the ASEAN-Korea
FTAs—have  yet  cut  bilateral  tariffs  in  a  serious  way.  The  region’s  other
arrangement, AFTA, created almost no discrimination since no one used it. Why
does this matter?
Real  regionalism  means  discriminatory  tariff  liberalization,  and  discrimination
sometimes creates tension. For example, the PRC will soon grant better market
access to a Malaysia-based firm than it does to a Japan-based firm—a fact that
will surely bother Japanese firms. In other regions of the world, such tensions
have lead to policy reactions, some of which have been disruptive to trade. The
most  common  policy  reaction  has  been  to  abort  the  implementation  of  the
discriminatory liberalization. This is often the case when it comes to South-South
FTAs like the PRC-ASEAN arrangement.
12
A nastier outcome, however, is also possible. The classic case was the round of
tariff escalations among the European trade blocs in the 1920s and 1930s. But
even without referring to the nightmare-scenario of Europe between the wars, it is
clear that bilateral liberalization can increase pressure on governments to offset
some pressure on domestic industry by raising protection against exports from
excluded economies. For example, the liberalization of the Malaysian auto sector
with respect to Japan might lead to new political pressures inside Malaysia to
raise tariffs against Korean firms, say, or to delay liberalization with other ASEAN
members. If the FTAs signed or near signing in early 2006 do what they say they
12 If  the  preferences  lead  to  the  delocation  of  firms  from  one  developing  economy  to  another
(usually the larger of the two since firms prefer to locate in the large market), the “losing” economy
often calls off the deal. Indeed, of the hundreds of regional trade deals in the world, only a couple of
dozen actually influence trade and only a couple of those are South-South arrangements.24
will  do,  East  Asia  will  witness  the  emergence  of  a  complex  pattern  of  tariff
discrimination.
Figure 7 shows a striking fact—the biggest trade flows in the region are the only
ones not covered by FTAs. The diagram shows the importance of the various
bilateral  trade  flows  in  the  region  with  small  flows  zeroed  out  to  improve
readability. The three largest bilateral trade flows—PRC-Japan, PRC-Korea and
Japan-Korea—will probably not be covered by FTAs by the end of 2006. Thus, it
is exactly the biggest flows in the region that will face discrimination. Korean firms
selling into PRC will face discrimination compared to Thai firms; PRC firms selling
into Japan will face discrimination compared to Malaysian firms, and so on. If the
Japan-Korea FTA gets signed, then PRC will face discrimination in both Japan
and Korea compared to Korean firms on the one hand and Japanese firms on the
other.
Figure 7: East Asian Bilateral Trade Flows Rounded to Nearest 1% of
Regional Flows (line width proportional to %)
Source: IMF DOTS database.
The logical implication of this fragility is obvious. The time for East Asian vision is
gone; the time for East Asian management is now.
4. NEW EAST ASIAN REGIONAL MANAGEMENT EFFORT (NEARME)
East Asian regionalism could have developed from visionary beginning, but it did
not.  Vision  takes  time,  a  lot  of  time;  Europeans,  for  example,  discussed  the
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continent’s  trade  arrangements  for  more  than  a  decade  before  the  EEC  was
formed. In East Asia, events just moved too fast. In just 4 years—from 2000 to
2004—the notion of economically significant FTAs in Asia went from unlikely to
obvious. All East Asian economies have a stake in ensuring that regional trade is
well  managed,  but  nothing  and  no  one  takes  responsibility  for this  “collective
action” problem. This is why the pressing need is for management, not vision.
This section considers some aspects of a regional management effort that could
keep the status quo running smoothly while discussion of vision proceeds.
4.1. A New East Asian Regional Management Effort: Institutions
Because the need for management is pressing, it seems clear that the region
should rely on existing institutional arrangements; it would take years to set up a
new  organization.  Given  this  constraint,  ASEAN+3  is  probably  the  best  suited
body for the management effort.
It is very easy to criticize ASEAN+3—for example, it is unwieldy to have so many
leaders in one place when they differ so greatly in terms of economic and trade
importance—but it has many positive sides. Chief among these is that it already
exists,  so  all  manner  of  delicate  diplomatic  issues  can  be  avoided  (just  the
question  of  who  should  participate  could  take  years  to  resolve).  Second,
ASEAN+3 has a track-record of cooperation and thus has some credibility in the
region. Third, it is not viewed as a creature of any single regional or non-regional
power. Fourth, it has not been viewed as a threat to nations outside the region.
Fifth, it encompasses all the economies whose competitiveness in European and
American markets depend upon intraregional trade flows, those which have the
greatest  stake  in  ensuring  that  intraregional  trade  is  well  managed,  without
including any significant nation that is a bystander when it comes to this collective
action problem. Sixth, it would be very easy to enlarge the group to include new
members if and when the need arose.
ASEAN+3  institutional  foundations,  however,  would  need  some  firming  up.
Although it is not an institution per se, it could quickly begin to operate as one by
acquiring  a  secretariat  of  its  own.  A  structure  for  the  political  direction  of  the
grouping is already in place, but it would need a secretariat of its own with a high-
quality staff of experts (legal, economic, customs, and trade matters).
The GATT—the WTO before the 1994 Marrakech accord—would provide a good
role model for the New East Asian Regional Management Effort (NEARME). The
GATT  operated  as  an  international  organization  without  actually  being  an
international organization. Indeed, although it would be a very bad idea to call the
new body an “Asian WTO,” (given the fate of the Asian Monetary Fund idea) this
is  effectively  what  NEARME  would  be.  The  GATT  operated  on  a  consensus
basis, engaged in “soft law” surveillance, enforcement, and adjudication, and yet
was the keystone to managing the rapid development of the world trade system
in the post-war period. More to the point, many economists believe that GATT’s
rules and its peer-pressure approach was responsible for FTAs in Europe and
elsewhere that did not threaten the multilateral system. The GATT, in short, was
the  “management  effort”  that  ensured  waves  of  regionalism  in  the  rest  of  the
world have gone smoothly. By focusing on regional issues and tailoring itself to
East Asian sensitivities, NEARME could foster a level of management discipline26
in the region more solid than what the WTO offers under the Enabling Clause and
more adapted to regional needs than the discipline it offers under Article 24.
4.2. Management priorities
The immediate priority of this new regional management effort could be to ensure
that the emerging pattern of tariff discrimination does not get in the way of the
smooth functioning of Factory Asia. In other words, the overriding priority should
be to protect the, favorable status quo in East Asian trade relations.
4.2.1. Priority #1: Bind the MFN Applied Rates
The first priority in the new East Asian regional management effort should be to
trim the bindings overhang and thus bring WTO constraints on East Asia’s low
tariffs into line with the political constraints (the fact that all would lose from a tariff
war).  The  first  step  would  be  to  convince  ASEAN+3  members  to  bind  their
applied  rates  in the WTO.  The  invigorated  ASEAN+3  body  should,  as a  bloc,
insist  that  nations  doing  this  get full  credit  in the  Doha  Round market access
talks. Indeed, this move might encourage other developing nations to bind their
applied  rates  and  this,  in  turn,  would  prove  a  very  positive  contribution  to
unblocking progress in the ongoing WTO round. As a bonus, it would give the
new organization a high and strongly positive international profile, demonstrating
to the world that the new grouping was WTO-friendly. Binding the non-preferential
rates would also improve the investment climate in the region since it would make
trade policy more predictable.
4.2.2. Priority #2: Transparency and Confidence Building Deliverables
The second priority for a new East Asian regional management effort would be to
improve transparency in the region. There are several obvious deliverables here.
ASEAN+3  could  set  up  an  information clearinghouse for  preferences, rules  of
origin  and  the  like.  Indeed,  as  part  of  the  new  management  effort,  the
participating economies could commit themselves to notifying the new ASEAN+3
secretariat of any and all trade policy or legal changes that affect trade in the
region. In the rosiest scenario, the new management could implement a scheme
like  the  one  that  the  EU  pushed  on  the  Euro-Med  region,  namely  the  Pan-
European Cumulation System (PECS). In the late 1990s, Europe was marked by
a Spaghetti Bowl of FTAs that was as complex as East Asia’s Noodle Bowl is
today. The EU managed the spaghetti bowl by harmonizing the tariff structures of
all  the  bilaterals,  imposing  a  common  set  of  rules  of  origin  and  insisting  on
cumulation throughout the region. Its hegemonic role was critical to this effort.
While  there  is  no  East  Asian  hegemon  to  play  a  similar  role,  meaning  the
outcome  is  unlikely  to  be  as  harmonious  as  PECS,  the  new  NEARME  could
introduce measures to reduce inconsistencies among East Asian bilaterals.
The  new  East  Asian  regional  management  effort  could  also  agree  minimum
standards for  East  Asian  FTAs—trade  agreements  that meet  these  conditions
could  be  called  ASEAN+3-compliant.  Of  course,  the  point  of  departure  would
have to be a set of conditions mild enough to fit all existing FTAs (just as the
GATT had to legalize existing preferences in 1947, such as those of the British
Commonwealth). But even this would be an improvement over the current lack of27
discipline faced by the FTAs that are notified under the Enabling Clause. The
value of such a set of standards would become apparent if nations failed to fulfill
the  liberalization  promises  they made  in the  FTAs.  Given  the  vast differences
around the world, the WTO has found it impossible to improve the discipline of
FTAs,  especially  those  notified  under  the  Enabling  Clause.  In  a  sense,  this
ASEAN+3-compliant  status  would  provide  a  level  of  discipline  intermediate  to
Article 24 and the Enabling Clause. Such a thing might prove attractive to other
South-South FTAs.
If history is any guide, the domino effect in East Asia will spread to many, many
more countries in the neighborhood. In Europe, for example, several waves of
domino  effects  have  left  the EU  with  preferential  trade  deals  with  all  but  nine
WTO members. It is therefore conceivable that the 13 members of ASEAN+3 will
end up signing a very large number of bilaterals in the coming years. It would be
very  helpful  to  the  smooth  functioning  of  Factory  Asia  to  have  agreed  some
discipline on the nature of these arrangements before they are signed.
As  it  stands,  there  is  no  systematic  surveillance  and  enforcement mechanism
covering all the East Asia’s FTAs. Given the diverse political situation of nations
in the region, such surveillance and enforcement would have to be of the “fair
broker” or technocratic type. There is no way ASEAN+3 members could agree to
give such a body the teeth of the EU Commission, but the very existence of an
unbiased observer and reporter of facts can often go a long way to avoiding or
resolving disputes. Just to take one example, authorities have often been known
to implement subtle measures that nullify and impair the effect of committed tariff
reductions. If tariff cutting was done in the context of the WTO, an aggrieved
party could always ask a WTO panel to make a determination on the matter. In
East Asia, there is no single body for investigating such claims. Actually, the old
GATT panels are a better analogy than current system of WTO panels. Before
the  Uruguay  Round,  the  findings  of  GATT  panels  could  be  blocked—and
occasionally  they  were—but  the  very  existence  of  such  a  fair-broker  body
reduced trade tensions around the world.
While  the  overriding  need  in  East  Asia  is  for  management,  the  region  will
eventually need a longer-term solution.
4.3. Longer run Goals for a New East Asian Regional Management Effort
The goal of regional organizations throughout the world is generally twofold: to
foster political harmony and economic efficiency, without actively causing harm to
nonmembers.  A  very  broad  range  of  organizational  and  institutional
arrangements have been used to attain these goals. These arrangements lie on a
continuum of supranationality. At the supranational end of the spectrum is the EU
with  its  legal  system,  supremacy  of  the  EU  Court,  and  decision-making  by
majority  voting.  At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum  are  the  many  purely
intergovernmental arrangements such as NAFTA. In between are regional trade
arrangements—such  as  the  EFTA—that  are  intergovernmental  in  terms  of
decision  making  but  which  have  institutions  and  organization  that  induce  and
lock-in cooperation.
The  crucial  dividing  line  between  intergovernmental  and  supranational  lies  in
decision-making. If the regional organization can make decisions that bind all the
members, yet need not be approved by each member, then we can say that the28
organization is supranational. For example, the EU decides its common external
tariff—including  antidumping  duties—on  the  basis  of majority  voting.
Consequently,  EU  members  frequently  find  themselves  having  to  adopt  trade
policies  that  they  do  not  want.
13 In  intergovernmental  organizations  such  as
NAFTA and EFTA, all nations must agree to everything.
4.3.1. EFTA: the Appropriate European Model for East Asia
The EU model is a nonstarter for East Asia. Imagine how ridiculous it would be to
propose an East Asian organization in which the PRC would have to adopt a
trade policy it disagreed with because Korea and Japan voted for it. When the EU
was born, the transfer of national sovereignty to a supranational trade body was
the goal and economic integration was the means. This attitude, which is rare
even in Europe today, is not part of any East Asian government’s plans. And this
fact  is  completely  independent  of  the  question  of  existing  conflicts  among
potential members of any such arrangement. Whether we are talking about Japan
and the PRC, Indonesia and Singapore, or Thailand and Korea—this group of
countries would not accept the pooling of sovereignty that an Asian-version of the
EU would imply. EU-style supranationality—even supranationality limited to trade
policy—is not for Asia, not now and not for the foreseeable future.
NAFTA provides an alternate template, but it too is wrong for East Asia. NAFTA
is one of the few regional arrangements outside of Europe that really works in the
sense of liberalizing trade that would not otherwise have been liberalized and
significantly shifting trade patterns (Holmes 2005). However, NAFTA’s success
has nothing to do with its institutional arrangements. It works because a single
nation is de facto in charge. The US market is 18 times that of Mexico’s and 12
times  that  of  Canada.  Since  market  size  spells  negotiating  power  in  trade
arrangements, it is easy to see why NAFTA works. A single nation has 90% of
the negotiating power and yet really cares about the organization’s success for
political,  geostrategic  and  commercial  reasons.  NAFTA’s  institutions  are  not
notably more developed than those of ASEAN, indeed in many ways ASEAN is
more highly structured since at least it has a permanent Secretariat.
It seems likely that the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) provides the
best model for the long-run shape of East Asian economic integration because
EFTA  is  purely  intergovernmental,  while  having  an  efficient  secretariat  and
enough institutional structure to deal with new challenges such as new members
and  expansion  of  the  integration  regime.  In  its  early  days,  EFTA  included
advanced  industrial  nations  (for  example,  Switzerland  and  the  UK)  but  also
developing nations (Portugal) and produced special and differential (SDT) rules
for  Portugal.  Given  the  great  disparities  in  East  Asia,  an  Asian  Free  Trade
Association should also include SDT-like policies and “structural funds” set up as
in the EU. This arrangement would
(i) Mitigate the hub-and-spoke bilateralism that has emerged in the region; this
would be especially beneficial to small East Asian nations that have fallen into
the spoke trap (Baldwin 2004).
13 A recent example came with the EU-PRC conflict over textile quotas. Several nations including
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK did not want quotas against PRC exports, but they were out-
voted  in  the  Council  of  Ministers,  so  they  were  forced  to  restrict  the  trade.  See  Baldwin  and
Wyplosz (2006) for details on the EU’s trade policy setting institutions and procedures.29
(ii) Avoid the noodle bowl problem by bring coherence to preferences and rules
of origin.
(iii) Create “conditionally open regionalism” in East Asia, which would result in
many  of  the  efficiency  aspects  of  APEC’s  Open  Regionalism  while  still
harnessing the critical political forces that are generated by preferential trade
liberalization.
(iv) Because Japan and Korea are developed nation members of the WTO, the
arrangement would need to obey article 24 disciplines. This discipline would
also make it less threatening to third nations or economies.
Note  that  as  Japanese  MFN  tariffs  are  very  low,  and  Korean  MFN  tariffs  are
relatively  low,  membership  in  this  arrangement  would  expose  members  to
something close to world market prices. This has two merits: (i) it greatly reduces
the scope for inefficient switches from low-cost nonmember suppliers to high-cost
member suppliers (trade diversion); and (ii) it means that joining would almost
surely foster further liberalization, as in the case of Mexico (see Baldwin 2004).
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As of early 2006, preferential tariff liberalization had yet to begin in East Asia. The
PRC-ASEAN FTA and the Japan bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members are just
starting  to  be  phased  in;  the  only  FTA  in  the  region  that  is  close  to  being
implemented, AFTA, does not count because almost none of intra-ASEAN trade
uses the preferences. Because discrimination is another word for preferential, it
can be said that East Asia has not yet seen what happens when tariffs are cut on
a  discriminatory  basis.  To  date,  the  smooth  growth  of  intraregional  trade  has
been driven by unilateral tariff cutting. Consequently, the remarkably harmonious
state  of  regional  trade  relations  during  the  last  two  decades  gives  us  little
indication of how the system will react to future tensions, including those arising
from the impending discriminatory tariff liberalization.
Given the extreme interdependence of almost all East Asian manufacturers on
intraregional trade and given the near total absence of WTO discipline on the
tariff reductions that made all this possible, the prospect of trade tensions should
be worrying to all the governments and companies in the region. To date, the
middle  management  of  Factory  Asia—the  private  companies—has  done  an
excellent  job  of  keeping  East  Asian  trade  running  smoothly.  But  middle
management  cannot  solve  all  problems.  If  shocks  to  the  system  led  some
economies  to  start  raising  tariffs,  rounds  of  tariff  retaliation  could  lead  to
substantial  disruption  of  intra-East  Asian trade.  Of  course,  everyone  would  be
hurt by this, but it would not be the first time in the course of human events that
small-minded  disputes  caused  huge  problems  due  to  a  lack  of  top-level”
management. Avoiding such outcomes requires a broader perspective than any
one nation or trade arrangement can provide. In short, managing the noodle bowl
should be a priority for all East Asian governments and companies.30
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